Bilbray — suprise! — says the contest is "sour grapes"!

... which shows how much he knows! "Sour grapes" is when you try for something and you don't get it, so then you pretend you never really wanted it. It comes from the fox in Aesop's fable who can't reach the grapes on a vine and gives up, saying: "I didn't want those grapes; they're probably sour."

Bilbray's quote descibes Busby's behavior --- but not the contest.

Is there any election law or voter that Haas gives a damn about?

I don't have any inside info but it seems to me that he might just give a damn about the election laws that grant him enough power that he can even try to pull off such a [expletive deleted] election.

So did they use the Clint Curtis software in these machines?

Great work Brad, I may be mistaken but it sure looks like you and VelvetRevolution are leading this election fight --- Where are all the other orgs --- it is great that the DNC added its support but where is the money to help out with this fight? Words are fine, but where's the beef?? Where's the war room and the strike force.

Keep it up, the fate of the world depends on your success.

Paragraph 19 of the complaint puzzles me, where it alleges:

"switch in the circuitry of the voting machine that allows the voting machine to boot from an external flash memory rather than an internal flash memory source"

I can't see that a remote boot is relevant to the lack of chain of custody, and as a matter of fact, it seems conceptually at odds.

If you boot remotely at the time the machine is brought on line on election day, how can it matter that the machine was or was not safe within the chain of custody before that remote boot?

In other words, it makes chain of custody irrelevant, yet alleges how important chain of custody is. And I think it is simply a matter of inartful pleading.

The actual problem is that when the chain of custody is violated, a new set of software can be put on the machine, THEN WHEN IT BOOTS it has new software on board that has not been certified, and in fact can even be subversive software.

Which has nothing to do with a "switch in the circuitry" or internal or external flash memory.

The scenario pleaded in paragraph 19 says this machine has circuitry inside which allows someone to trip a switch so that after the switch it will, on election day, boot from software in memory not on that machine ... for instance a remote location off site.

But that requires it to be online on election day, which is not generally going to happen.

What could happen, under the facts plead, is that an election official trips a switch, after going online first, then the machine boots remotely.

This is clumsy, because from what I have heard, these machines go down a lot, and this remote boot would have to be done over and over with each re-boot during the election day.

Very stupid and unlikely.

Furthermore, in a remote boot of this sort, the type of memory on the remote machine, whether flash or not, is irrelevant.

Paragraph 19 should say that the design allows uncertified software to be loaded onto the machine by someone other than the poll worker assigned to that machine, whether said reload of software is known or unknown to that poll worker.

That aspect of the vulnerability of Diebold machines has nothing to do with a "switch in the circuitry of the voting machine that allows the voting machine to boot from an external flash memory rather than an internal flash memory source".

My take on it is that the complaint was not sufficiently reviewed by technicians prior to the final draft.

They can amend the pleading.

The difference between a tally machine, which adds up results from one or more voting machines at one or more precincts, and a vote taking machine should also be discussed.

Paragraph 19 of the complaint makes more sense when applied to a tally machine.

These machines are generally not used by the public, like the vote taking machines are.

These tally machines, instead, just add up the totals from the vote taking machines.

It would make sense that a tally machine (e.g. central tabulator) could boot from a remote source, once online and once a switch is tripped by the operator.

That is because it would only happen once and would be done out of sight ... after the polls close and all the doors are locked.

This requires a corrupt official, where the other scenario of an invalid chain of custody does not.

The chain of custody violation can allow a hack even with an honest, albeit negligent, election official and/or poll worker.

Another issue which I think voting rights litigators should pursue, when alleging constitutional violations, is person liability.

In a recent case the Chief of Police, and others, who violated or conspired to violate the civil rights of protesters can be sued personally:

The D.C. Circuit today ruled that "The mass arrest at Pershing Park violated the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of plaintiffs. . ." The Court of Appeals ruling rejects the appeal by Chief of Police Charles H. Ramsey, in which Ramsey claimed that he should not be held personally liable for these sweeping constitutional rights violations, clearing the way for a trial on Ramsey's responsibility. The Court also upheld the District Court's denial of qualified immunity to Assistant Chief of Police Peter Newsham who also commanded the arrests.

(link here, bold added). Nothing like a multi-million dollar judgment against an official, personally, to help them to begin to get it and get it good.

Well Dread #5

The reason that slot for an external flash boot memory is troublesome in combinintion with sleepovers is that, before elction workers take custody of the machines I suppose they must have been tested and somehow been verified. Now, if someone were up to no good so to speak, during the sleapover with the machine unattended in a garage somewhere, that guy or gal could easily slip into that garage, get himself access to the machine and slip an external flash memory into the available slot and then take a hike.

At election day the unsuspecting election worker starts up the machine wich then boots the from the bogus untested software instead of the tested one.

Voila.

High5,Stockholm #8

Under your hypothetical scenario the added flash would no longer be "external flash memory rather than an internal flash memory", but instead would then be internal flash memory.

If it boots from that added internal flash memory it is no longer booting "from an external flash memory rather than an internal flash memory source".

Even if the pleadings had been written in Swedish.

Furthermore, under your scenario it would be better to overwrite the existing memory in the existing card, with new subversive software, because the additional card would unnecessarily invite/risk detection.

High5,Stockholm #8

I forgot to mention that I did not mention "that slot for an external flash boot memory".

That is a creature that does not exist in paragraph 19 of the complaint, and instead is of your own imagination.

What I quoted from paragraph 19 of the complaint was:

"switch in the circuitry of the voting machine that allows the voting machine to boot from an external flash memory rather than an internal flash memory source"

You should read posts closely and if you are a lawyer, you must read pleadings closely.

What you have done is a straw man that replaces "switch in the circuitry of the voting machine that allows the voting machine to boot from an external flash memory" with "additional slot where another flash memory card can be added".

This is neglectful.

High5,Stockholm #8

I just searched thru the complaint in Adobe and neither the word "slot" nor the word "card" appear in the complaint (if I searched properly).

So I do not know where you got the slot/card idea, except as I mused above.

Finally, it is Dredd not Dread.

You must have gotten up before breakfast today sir (or madame)?

Dredd,
I sure hope you or folks like you (knowledgable about these machines) are there in San Diego overseeing this IMPORTANT effort.
I'd hate for it to fail due to lack of knowledge of technical details.
Please God let them know what they're doing!

Oops dread,

I was under the impression there was an extra slot to put that flash memory in and that the 'external' quality of the extra flash was just to distinguish it from the built in one. My bad. Glad you caught it though.

"It is known to sources inside and outside Washington D.C. that Mel Gibson has previously expressed interest in subject matter positively confirming the identiy of Jeff Gannon. Jeff Gannon did infiltrate the White House for two years and did compromise the presidency of George W. Bush. The story of Gannon's unbridled Whitehouse access was effectively surpressed by the mainstream media.

It has been leaked to the FBI that an individual (a female) with a personal relationship to Jeff Gannon and Noreen Gosch can positively ID Gannon as Johnny Gosch and wants to go public with her story. It is also known that she is a traditional Roman Catholic who would most likely want to give the story to Mel Gibson."

High5, Stockholm #13

I did not intend to indicate a bad by you, after all, I was criticizing a pleading by a professional lawyer initially.

Furthermore, what you said could happen of course, but we have to be aware also of what the most skilled hackers would do.

Something I have done professionally as well as just being an observer from the sidelines rooting for the home team.

But if we do not critique the weakness so they can beef it up, they will be taken by surprise.

So ... lets look for weakness ... because rest assured the dark side of the force will pick it up if we don't!

Joan #12

You can always tell a lawyer, but you can't tell them very much ... I always rub their noses in it when I warn them, they ignore the warning, and the inevitable then happens.

The fact that they are working hard against the manual count might indicate they have something to hide that would be revealed by a hand count of the ballots. If eventually they do allow the count to happen, that's when I'd be afraid of them having doctored the ballots to match what the central tabulators have recorded. They've had plenty of time to do this. If Haas can't present very clear documentation of a secure chain of custody of the ballots, I'd be very keen on checking the ballots themselves for manipulations.

We need to make sure we also look for ways to identify ballot tampering that might have been done postfacto when any potential conspirators might have realized they'd have to go through a manual count after earlier assuming the ballots would be destroyed without such scrutiny. Folks, think of ways to identify your ballot in a stack of ballots in your precinct (or to help show that it is missing and presumably "replaced"). Perhaps you can help with identifying any such manipulation in so doing.

Though ballot manipulation could put some in even bigger trouble and is harder to do than election fraud through voting machine hacks, and therefore is probably not likely to have taken place, it wouldn't hurt to cover our bases in case that has been done to cover someone's tracks.

I think it's obvious that we do not have a democracy in this country.

How come, even though the MSM is reporting (a little) on e-vote fraud, NO ONE is making the link that the 2004 election was stolen? How can you report on e-vote fraud, and not "connect" back to 2004 exit polls saying Kerry won??? Why is no one doing this???

Big Dan #17

"Truth"? ... "you can't handle the truth!"

You know ...

#14 Mae - Joseph Cannon has already reported and debunked. Fake BBC web page.

#3 Patrick - How interesting! I wonder if there could ever be copyright infringement due Clint. Or does YEI want to claim sole ownership of that code LOL!!!

Dredd, Is it possible to insert the thing for some sort of soft boot after tally to flip? (No need to answer if the question was really stupid

Brad & the Team

Off Topic Here sorry.
There is so much on this blog it could be made into an official Bradblog CD or DVD. Check with Lawyeres first though. History in the making in detail with the proceeds used to change history and feed starving bloggers, activists and the like. Sure anyone can download the blog but an official DVD would be like a valuable coin or stamp. There could be several volumes to the CD set.

Miss Persistent #19

There are several ways to do it. The Hursti reports over at Black Box Voting detail several ways.