What ever happened to all them missing mem cards in Ill. ? Did I miss them re-appearing ?

John, I think a story has been missed here. Of the 5, I now focus on the Texas case.

You said "The counties needed those services or they would be forced to use paper ballots so they found themselves between a rock and ES&S and they were finally squeezed into making the vendor happy" (bold added).

Forced into the solution is a problem?

I think that Texans blew it. Here was an opportunity to go to paper ballots. That would be an advance, in my opinion, not a retro.

We know machines are currently insecure, and therefore our democracy is currently insecure. Paper ballots and hand counting are the better solution at this time.

Texans missed the ball.

There is no way we are going to get the best solution in this election cycle, so settle for the safer bet.

Texans also erred in showing their cards. If they have the option to go to paper ballots and hand counts then the fraudy election machine vendors do not have dictatorial powers.

Texans caved in and blew it for all of us. Someone set the example and stand up to the dictators of elections.

We elect election officials to represent us, not to represent the fraud for profit crowd.

Floridiot #1 -
There was no announcement that I ever saw that said they had found all, or a portion, of the cards. I can only assume that they did because they claim that all votes were counted.

Dredd #2 -
The choice of the word "forced" was probably not a good one. However, the state made it very clear, with scare tactics (always a good right-wing tactic) that if the counties even considered using paper the DoJ would swoop down on them and fine them and do all kinds of other unnatural acts on their body and person.

Essentially, the state colluded with ES&S to force the counties to pay the rest of their bills and to bow under to the vendor.

DIEBOLD ALERT!

4-3-06: ALERT - elections officials: Diebold making 'visits' to your equipment

Please forward to your local elections officials:

Warning: Black Box Voting has received credible first-hand reports from multiple states that Diebold is making unannounced visits to counties, sometimes when the elections supervisor is out of town. Diebold has prevailed on assistants and managed to gain access to the voting equipment.

Elections employees report to us that their questions to Diebold are not being answered to their satisfaction.

Here is what to look out for, and why this is so important:

1. Program changes: Watch very carefully whether Diebold puts a card into your machine and boots it up. Alert your staff to be on the lookout for this. By inserting one card, either the operating system or the voting software can be altered. Inserting two cards can change both.

Such changes can hide evidence of the kind of security vulnerabilities found by Harri Hursti and Security Innovation Inc. in Emery County, Utah. However, replacing the operating system and programs does not ensure the integrity of your machines, since the security vulnerabilities found appear to be able to survive overwriting both the operating system and the programs.

2. Swapping out equipment or components: We have credible reports that Diebold has swapped motherboards in some machines. We have less firm reports that Diebold has made reference to repartitioning memory and/or other adjustments. Either swapping the motherboard or repartitioning could obscure evidence of programming that shouldn't be there, and/or introduce new vulnerabilities to your system.

3. Swapping or recording serial numbers. The Diebold serial numbers do not appears to be burned into the machine/motherboard itself, but are simply affixed with a plate that can be replaced.

You should, immediately, photograph each of your machines' serial numbers.

Diebold denies that they have sold used equipment. However, a recent response from Deborah Seiler, the former Diebold sales rep who is now Elections Registrar for Solano County, California, gives a perception that someone is not being forthcoming.

Solano County used the Diebold TSx for one election and then rejected the system. Seiler, who took office shortly after Solano rejected the Diebold equipment, has reportedly responded to a public records request for Solano County TSx serial numbers by claiing that they were given back to Diebold and that Solano County no longer has them.

Diebold's odd explanation in Utah, that there were perhaps Chinese or Asian fonts on touch-screens delivered to Utah, would be consistent with selling machines from California. There were some 800 to 900 TSx machines, apparently, rejected by Solano County.

Black Box Voting encourages all recipients of "new" Diebold TSx machines to log serial numbers immediately, photograph or videotape them, and do so before Diebold arrives to visit your machines if at all possible.

It would be a good idea to take the keys to the voting machine storage facility with you when you are not in the office. Advise your staff not to allow Diebold to access your machines without your presence.

If Diebold comes to visit your machines, you are advised to tape record, videotape, and have several witnesses present to observe exactly what they do.

Better yet, tell them you need a written work order specifying what they will be doing in detail before you authorize it, and stand over them to observe during any access to any part of your system.

Diebold is a private company. As soon as you took delivery on your system, you have the responsibility to be in control of it and observe at all times. You are under no obligation to allow a vendor access (even if your state has mandated that you take these machines).

The upcoming security report, along with the testimony of Wyle Labs at the California Senate Elections Committee hearing last week, provide clear indications as to why preservation of your system AS IT WAS DELIVERED TO YOU should remain "as is."

Original BBV post is here.