In the age of computer fraud we are now in gearing audit size to "victory margin" doesn't seem like a very good idea. "Victory margin" in a fraudulent election is the difference between the fraud used to alter the result and fraud needed to change the result. The "victory margin" has little if any correlation to how equally divided the voters were on the issue at hand.

Lest we forget another best friend of election fraud detection: Exit Poll Science

Exit poll science provides tools that have been used for decades successfully. Accurate predictions are the legacy of these tools.

The 2000 and 2004 official election results were at odds with the exit poll predictions.

Those doing the polls, Edison/Mitofsky, were of the popular mindset "it can't happen here". This mindset is not prepared to entertain any notion of election fraud as the reason for the massive first time discrepancies.

They instead offered the explanation that "republicans were more shy than democrats" and that is why the massive discrepancy. They did not even consider election fraud.

A study done by 8 Phd's and one MS pointed this out and that election fraud must not be ruled out. They said:

"3. Inaccurate Election Results

Edison/Mitofsky did not even consider this hypothesis, and thus made no effort to contradict it. Some of Edison/Mitofsky's exit poll data may be construed as affirmative evidence for inaccurate election results. We conclude that the hypothesis that the voters’ intent was not accurately recorded or counted cannot be ruled out and needs further investigation".

(Phd's Speak Out, emphasis added). Other experts have said: "Flaws in any of these aspects of a voting system, however, can lead to indecisive or incorrect election results".

Edison/Mitofsky and the MSM, who used the data, can't bear to even consider that America could be corrupted in its election processes. A position entirely at odds with common sense and official scientific inquiry.

{Ed note: This is the second time I've asked you not to just paste stuff into the comments section here. If you want to draw our attention to something, say so, and provide a LINK to it. --99}

Bob Young #1--exactly! Including the possibility of insider fraud in the statistical model means that the only way to produce a "confidence interval of 99%" is to audit (hand count) 99% of the ballots.

The possibility of fraud, big or small, by insiders or outsiders is quite well covered by the post-election audit process we outlined in the report.

The preliminary results should be public, before the selection of precincts for audit. The random number drawing should be public. The random precincts selected for hand counting should be hand counted in public, and blindly, i.e. without knowledge of the "target" preliminary count. All discrepancies that can be resolved should be documented and resolved in public. Discrepancies that are real, meaning the machine miscounted the ballot, should be documented (and the results adjusted) in public. The calculation of the statistical confidence, indicating whether or not to accept the election results and stop the audit can be calculated by anyone. If the confidence is not high enough the audit should continue with more random precincts audited.

Because all of this is done in public, and observable, the opportunities for insider fraud are drastically reduced.

And the dependence of the sample size on the initial margin of victory (and the other parameters) is exactly what is appropriate mathematically. Failure to do that makes any audit either inadequate or inefficient.

Please don't make a snap judgment about the auditing process we endorse. Please read the report, and also the documents we cite.

Thanks David!

Sound like you have a much better set up than most I have seen but I still think the size of the audit is much better geared to the results the audit is finding than to how close any fradulent electronic "count" might have been.

David #5

I looked over the report and it is well done and covers the bases IMO. I can't quite agree with Semperfi #4. The science is more mature than that.

And I don't think Bob #1 disagrees, because your report does not limit it entirely to any one factor.

It takes several factors to develop an applicable comprehensive sampling theory and apply it to any particular circumstance. One size fits all is a less than skilled approach.

Your inclusion of Philip Stark, a statistician, and Amy Lehmkuhl, a C.P.A. adds comprehensiveness to the equation IMO.

My understanding at this time, after reading some other works too, is that like exit polling, the key is to see the proper statistical sampling pattern to be used in an audit.

And that, as your report details, is a function of the particular context at the particular time. In other words, the "situation on the ground" .

Such a well done pattern in an audit, like in an exit poll, can detect irregularities even with what Semperfi would consider to be a small percentage of sampling.

One commentor says that testing a very small sample of votes by way of the voter verification of their paper ballot would virtually guarantee that the precinct has a valid or an invalid tally:

The receipt verification approach provides three real benefits:

1) It is essential for smaller races, like Congressional districts, where recounting precincts with VVPB does not provide an acceptable confidence level.

2) It is much simpler and cheaper for the same level of confidence than recounting precincts.

3) Only a small number of ballots need be verified to guarantee a large confidence in the election as a whole.

4) The most heinous, malicious attempts to cheat anywhere in the system, from the voter’s intent to tabulated result, would be detected with guaranteed confidence.

(Adler 2003). Jones cites Adler.

Anyway, it is refresing to see a competent, professional, and non-partisan approach as you have done in the report.

Congrats to all in the whole effort. This is something other states can use, and so can los federales .

My short comment above was not meant to be taken mathematically, but figuratively. The point is DRE voting machines do not produce a ballot in the traditional sense, no matter what Holt writes in his bill. VVPT can not be demonstrated to be the same as the votes that are counted. Audits or recounts of such do not provide any "confidence" to me.