Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

While organizations like People For The American Way, Common Cause, and Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition argue that the continued use of DRE voting machines is necessary to support the foreign language speaking minority, they ignore that those machines may, in fact, serve to disenfranchise more voters from that community than they help. A new study from VotersUnite.Org proves that the undervote rate in minority communities in New Mexico plummeted when those communities changed from DRE to optical scan voting systems.

According to BradBlog; “California's new Secretary of State, Debra Bowen, has flatly rejected a request from Riverside County, CA County Supervisor Jeff Stone to participate in a "hack test" challenge originally proposed to Election Integrity Advocates in response to their concerns about security and accuracy for the county's electronic touch-screen voting machines.” ...

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

Princeton’s Professor Ed Felten said this in regards to the Sarasota Co. Florida voting machine report, “Experience teaches that systems that are insecure tend to be unreliable as well — they tend to go wrong on their own even if nobody is attacking them. Code that is laced with buffer overruns, array out-of-bounds errors, integer overflow errors, and the like tends to be flaky. Sporadic undervotes are the kind of behavior you would expect to see from a flaky voting technology. The study claims to have ruled out reliability problems as a cause of the undervotes, but their evidence on this point is weak, and I think the jury is still out on whether voting machine malfunctions could be a significant cause of the undervotes.”

The town of Putney, Vermont may be about ready to accept a free optical-scan machine from the state. They will no longer count their votes the traditional way; hand counting. Gone will be the crowd of counters sharing pizza and enjoying the community spirit. Putney is not alone as 75 of the state’s 246 municipalities have already made the decision to change over to optical-scan. ...

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

According to the South Florida Sun-Sentinel, “A state-mandated test of voting machines before the March municipal election went off without a flaw Friday at the Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections, officials said. Elections Supervisor Arthur Anderson tested 2 percent of the 830 machines that will be in use during the March 13 city elections, running mock ballots to make sure the computerized voting systems and touch-screen machines are working.” 2 percent? That’s not a test, it’s a spot check.

In a press release today PFAW said, “An audit report released by the Florida Secretary of State’s office regarding Sarasota County’s November election debacle came under fire shortly after its release today. “This audit’s a whitewash. It is the result of a flawed process overseen by people with a stake in the outcome, and it will not be the last word on this matter,” said People For the American Way Foundation President Ralph G. Neas. “Something went terribly wrong in Sarasota County last November—and voters have provided credible evidence that widespread voting machine malfunctions were part of the problem. Unfortunately, this report papers over that evidence.”...

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

According to an article in the San Francisco Chronicle, “San Francisco supervisors told representatives of a voting machine company Wednesday that the firm will need to publicly display details of the software it uses to count ballots in order to win a $12.6 million, four-year contract with the city. At a Budget and Finance Committee hearing, Supervisors Tom Ammiano and Chris Daly urged representatives of Sequoia Voting Systems of Oakland to place software codes for touch-screen voting devices and paper ballot-scanning machines on the Internet or in another public forum, so the public can review how the machines tabulate votes.” ... Steven Bennet, a Sequoia representative, said Sequoia won't agree to public disclosure [of source code on voting machines] since it would "jeopardize the security to all of our customers in California and across the country."” ...

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

An article in today’s Oakland Tribune relates, “In a blow-by-blow on his school Web page and in a separate filing for an electronic voting lawsuit in New Jersey superior court, computer science professor Andrew Appel [Princeton University] details how he was able to purchase five of the Oakland-based company's AVC Advantage machines off a Web site auctioning government surplus items, pry open the backs and access the computer chips that control the vote count. He said security features touted by the Oakland-based company on its Web site were not in place on the machines.” Meanwhile Sequoia ‘spokes-deceiver’ Michelle Shafer ignores the facts and says, "This is not a real-world scenario. The equipment is not kept somewhere where people have unfettered access to it." Shafer does not live in the real-world where counties allow “sleep-overs” or store the machines, in the open, without guard at the polls for days before and after an election. Shafer speaks from a different plane where down is up and up is down....

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

USAToday reports, “A study by the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University shows turnout in 2004 was about 4% lower in states that required voters to sign their name or produce documentation. Hispanic turnout was 10% lower; the difference was about 6% for blacks and Asian-Americans.” And what do we hear from the Election Assistance Commission that, last year, buried a report that found there was very little evidence of voter fraud, the very reason some say they need voter ID laws? The commission's chairwoman, Donetta Davidson, called the study "premature." More work needs to be done, she said. "You can't make determinations based on one year," she said. "We have new states that have ID requirements now that weren't in that review."” If Davidson can’t bury the truth it appears she will deny it exists....

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

There must be no undisclosed voting system software. However, HR 811's proposed HAVA Section 301(a)(9), as currently written, fails to exempt software that is truly Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) from public disclosure. The bill must be amended to require true COTS software, such as the Windows operating system and standard printer drivers, to be escrowed and available to officials under confidentiality, but not publicly disclosed. // Connecting voting system components to the Internet or transmitting system information over the Internet facilitates hacking. However, HR 811's proposed HAVA Section 301(a)(11), as currently written, would allow the central Election Management System (EMS) computer of a voting system to be connected to the Internet. The EMS computer of a voting system is arguably the component most critical to protect from Internet connection. The bill must be amended to ban all Internet connections for all components of a voting system. In addition, the bill should include a ban on the Internet transmission of voted overseas ballots referenced in HR 811's proposed HAVA Section 301(a)(2)(C)....

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

A judge in New Jersey has threatened to pull the plug on the state’s Sequoia Advantage voting machines. State law requires voting systems be tested and certified by the state yet the only documents the state could find to show they certified the machines was a document from 1987. The judge has given the state 20 days to provide all documents that show there had been further testing and certification of changes to the original system. The judge also seems to have doubts as to whether Sequoia can successfully provide a state mandated vvpat printer for the Advantage machines by Jan. 2008. She has given the state three months to prove to her satisfaction that they have a good back-up plan.

Studies show that most voters do not verify the "paper trail" of their ballot, printed by a DRE; a fact denied by Common Cause and other groups who fervently defend the Holt Bill (HR-811). A voter verified paper audit trail printer on the machines in Sarasota County would have made little to no difference in the undervote rate in the CD-13 race. By contrast, voter-marked paper ballots are inherently verified by the voters, and thus provide a true record of voter intent and they would have made all the difference in the world in Sarasota County. ...

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 gives specific qualifications for Election Assistance Commission commissioners. They “shall have experience with or expertise in election administration or the study of elections.” Yesterday the Senate Rules and Administration Committee passed, with no hearings, the nomination of Caroline Hunter to replace Paul DeGregorio as a commissioner. Hunter has voted in the past. That is most of her experience in elections. Most recently Ms. Hunter served as Deputy Director of Public Liaison for the White House. She’s also been a Deputy Counsel to the RNC. Clearly Hunter was not selected for this position based on HAVA mandated experience....

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

I never thought I would be in agreement with a Florida Secretary of State but Kurt Browning was exactly right when he stated, "The interest groups are looking for a system that is 100 percent perfect. I don't know how many times I have to tell them this: it's just not going to happen." The statement was aimed at groups like American Association of People with Disabilities and Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition and People For The American Way. These groups argue against solutions that will allow the disabilities community and the foreign language community to vote in private and without assistance while preaching that only Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines are the solution.

Yesterday Sen. Dianne Feinstein formally asked the Government Accountability Office to do a “top to bottom investigation” of paperless voting machines with a focus on the machines used in Sarasota....

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

According to a new report issued by VoterAction and Demos, “Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines, once considered essential to ensuring private and independent voting booth access for voters with disabilities, often do not work as promised, according to a new report published today. Authored by access technology expert Noel Runyan and published by election reform groups Demos and Voter Action, 'Improving Access to Voting: A Report on the Technology for Accessible Voting Systems' shows that, due to inadequate or malfunctioning voting machines, voters with disabilities are frequently forced to ask for assistance or compromise the privacy of their vote— severe violations of federal disability accommodation requirements. The report details significant difficulties for voters with disabilities, including: the lack of a controllable interface for those who are unable to use touch screens or tactile key inputs; inadequate audio access features for people with visual or cognitive impairments, with dyslexia, or with severe motor-impairments; and lack of privacy curtains to prevent others from reading the voters’ selections on their visual displays.

'I originally had high hopes for the new voting machines' said Noel Runyan, the author of the report. Runyan, who is blind, is a professional electrical engineer who has spent much of his career developing access technologies for people with visual impairments. 'Even with my technical background and the help of poll workers, I could not get the Sequoia Edge II DRE to work. I have since tested most of the available voting systems at conferences and at the National Federation of the Blind’s accessible voting systems lab, and my fears have been confirmed: Most of the DREs deployed were not designed with real disability access in mind.'”...

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

The groups and individuals endorsing this statement commend Congressman Rush Holt for all that is excellent in HR 811, the "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007" --- such as the ban on wireless communications, requirements for disclosed source code and hand audits, and the mandate that testing labs be contractually independent from vendors. However, we cannot, with good conscience, give our endorsement to HR 811. We believe we have a duty to call attention to the bill's unacceptable shortcomings and to call for the needed amendments.

In a press release to respond to the Princeton statements about Sequoia’s lack of security mechanisms in their voting machines Sequoia says, “Election security encompasses people, processes and voting technology. And all of Sequoia's voting systems have numerous safeguards to detect any attempt to tamper with a machine or election results --- as true security demands a combination of features.” It’s funny that Princeton Professor Appel found none of the security safeguards present in the machines he has inspected....

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

The Orlando Sentinel opines, “Such controversies [Jennings-Buchanan] have added impetus to calls nationwide to require paper trails for electronic voting. But printers on a touch-screen machine wouldn't prevent software problems or tampering that could taint the results. Florida's experience with touch-screen voting has shown that operating the machines properly has been beyond the technical abilities of some poll workers. Printers could introduce a new set of mechanical problems. What happens if the paper jams, or the toner runs out? Meanwhile, optical-scan is a low-tech system that produces ballots that can be recounted by hand to verify election results. Rather than require states with electronic-voting machines to add a paper trail, Congress should be encouraging them to follow Florida, and cut their losses.” We agree.

A Portland [Maine] Press-Herald columnist says, “Legislation to this effect was introduced in the House of Representatives this past week, and companion legislation is being prepared in the Senate. The proposed Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act does not, however, solve the problems of confusion, intimidation and machine malfunction generated by touch-screen technology. Ultimately, the best overall solution may be a semi-automated one that combines traditional paper ballots with comparatively inexpensive optical scanners; it's the system already used successfully in Canada for national elections, as well as by all or part of 28 states in the United States. And it provides a reliable paper trail for those inevitable recounts. Obviously, Diebold won't like it. Too bad; it's our democracy.”...

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

Ex-New Mexico SoS Rebecca Vigil-Giron was term-limited out of office in Nov. The Governor then named her to a new position as the head of the state’s new film museum. Now that job has been put on hold by the Governor until a $3Million shortfall in the SoS office can be explained.

It appears that the state of New Jersey may have violated its state laws when it certified the Sequoia AVC Advantage machines they have been using for years. There is no documentation to show that the system was ever inspected. Also a team at Princeton purchased five of the machines from an on-line government clearance house for $86. The same machines cost one New Jersey county $8000 per machine. The Princeton team put them to good use as they picked the locks within 7 seconds. They quickly learned how to manipulate the software to switch votes....

Guest Blogged by John Gideon of VotersUnite.org

I highly recommend that everyone reading this take the time to read Lowell Finley’s “Testimony to Senate Committee on Rules and Administration” [see below]. It is excellent.

The New York Times editorializes, “It is good news that Ms. Feinstein has called for the federal investigations — and that she is pushing a bill to require paper trails nationally. As long as there are no paper records, and voting machine manufacturers continue to insist that the software that runs the machines is a 'trade secret,' voters cannot be expected to trust that votes are being counted correctly. The leadership in Congress needs to focus on making sure that Ms. Feinstein’s paper-trail bill becomes law, along with a companion House measure from Rush Holt, Democrat of New Jersey.” We need to add that we hope that Senator Feinstein will fix the various problems that are in the Holt bill. We don’t expect that she will ban the use of DREs, though we encourage her to do that, and we cannot support any legislation that does not include that ban. We do hope, however, that she fixes audit language that would allow a county to easily skirt the bill's requirements; language that squelches the use of alternative, low-tech voting systems amongst other; and the co-opting of “paper ballot” when the legislation uses that term to describe what is really a voter verified paper audit trail. These are only three of a short list of items that must be addressed. ...