8 Responses

1. 

   1)

   Doug Eldritch said on 1/13/2006 @ 4:33pm PT: [Permalink]

   Goodbye Bob Ney, yes you’re going to be indicted….

   And for gods sake….CAN’T we hurry this along so everyone can vote on HR-550 and the paper record requirement becomes law?!???!

   HAVA being ammended with HR 550 would also make mandatory manual-random audits, against all the protest of fraud ridden company Diebold/Sequoia. Random audits ensure fraud or mistakes on either side get caught.

   And that is all which should happen mandating it nation wide.

   Doug E.

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   Floridiot said on 1/14/2006 @ 4:05am PT: [Permalink]

   Right John, and not the ITAA either

   Them good ol STINKTANKS make it CONfusing to the average Joe

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   Dredd said on 1/14/2006 @ 5:33am PT: [Permalink]

   For those who have not yet sent the emails John mentions, they are very easy to send.

   Just follow the link, fill out a few fields, and click to send the email to the relevant officials.

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   Doug Eldritch said on 1/14/2006 @ 12:21pm PT: [Permalink]

   What Dredd mentioned above; VERY important…..and take it to the streets and boycott your elections office.

   Arizona up to the same tricks again; someone needs to seek out a special prosecutor
   Email senator harper: jharper@azleg.state.az.us

   Note: The democrats are stealing elections in Arizona and so has this new libertarian, so don’t assume that its all going "one" way…

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   Doug Eldritch said on 1/14/2006 @ 2:26pm PT: [Permalink]

   Here is some more evidence to show everyone needs to get off their high horse and make this bi-partisan for serious reform:

   This guy’s a hard-line conservative, but he is NOT a neocon and he’s not like Senator Chris Dodd.

   "Personally, I would require there be entries on each line for "no choice", for which the voter must select, to indicate an intentional non-vote for any candidate. Also, for the sake of perception if nothing else, companies that produce DREs should be restricted to far less access to the hardware and software than they appear to have now. My proposed plan addresses that as well.

   The plan is necessarily bold and comprehensive, which is required to satisfy all the transparency issues. Because even with the remedies that GAO and others have urged, computers are by their nature complex devices, and who’s inner workings are less visible than paper or punch ballots, which people on the left still prefer. The voting system I outline offers the efficiency and accommodation to the handicapped (etc.) that only computer interfaces can offer, but with the transparency and confidence that paper ballots are perceived to offer.

   If DREs continue to be employed absent of a comprehensive plan like mine, then I fear that confidence in election results will wane. Computer glitches will never be proven to the losing side to be accidental. Opponents of electronic ballots will continue to argue that it’s impossible to verify that the vote which was cast was the vote that got tabulated. And the other side will continue to allege that the vote that was cast wasn’t from an eligible voter. And of course, whenever exit polls don’t resemble the subsequent actual vote, the left will challenge the accuracy of the actual vote.

   [Note that when this occurred in 2004, not only had left-wing Democrats dismiss the admissions from liberal mainstream media that their polling consortium had skewered their test samplings more toward Kerry, they also wouldn’t accept the logical sequelae that it had the effect of discouraging Republican voters and depressing turnout for Bush. And all this occurred BEFORE their rage against the DRE machine had taken hold the way it has now. Today, the paranoia and distrust is at it’s zenith.]

   One can only appreciate the juxtaposition from the usual political stances: The Republicans favor the HAVA voting reforms that call for modernization, while Democrats prefer the status quo and urged states not to enact laws to qualify for the HAVA grants. They oppose robust voter eligibility screening and want states to keep using paper ballots or the old lever-operated mechanical machines.

   Preventing Voter Fraud

   The ideal remedy to all forms of voting frauds must be comprehensive, else those who feel cheated from ballot tampering will feel justified in perpetrating voter fraud, and vice versa. Thus, we cannot merely seek the ideal voting device, for example, without trying to get voter fraud under control. As John Fund notes in "Stealing Elections", prosecuting election fraud is almost nonexistent for a variety of both political and practical reasons. So we need a systemic, uniform and comprehensive solution.

   Almost every type of flaw in our voting system which I mentioned in the previous sections can be traced to one factor common in all balloting systems used in the U.S.: A ballot once cast cannot be traced to the voter who cast it. It might seem obvious that this prevents us from discovering what Republicans seem most concerned about: ineligible voters. But it also prevents what Democrats claim to want most—that all ballots are counted, and counted accurately.

   My proposed solution might also seem to violate an axiom in this country: the privacy of our vote. But with encryption technology, that should not be a concern. After I run through my proposed ballot system, you will see how that’s accomplished:

   The state supplies a registered voter with a unique registration number. That number will never have other data linked to it, other than the person’s name, date of birth, current residential address, political party registration, and a face photograph of the person. As it’s always been, voter registration information will be in the hands of local election officials, to allow them to properly identify people as eligible to vote or not. Election officials will never have access to how people voted. As you’ll read later, such information might only need to be "unblinded" to authorized investigators to look into indications of fraud or tabulation errors. I suggest that it may be the state’s attorney general, or some nonpartisan entity that the state may designate.

   The sole reason for the ID number is that numbers are unique identifiers that cannot be duplicated, and it’s required for the computer tracking process described later. Voters must register as usual. They will receive their voter registration card in the mail—sent to the address they claimed as theirs. The card itself will contain only 3 pieces of the total information: The person’s photograph, his registration number, and his election district. It will also contain a magnetic strip of the registration number, so that the voter can "swipe it" while in the voting booth, for ease and speed.

   That’s right, voting will be a little like a transaction at an ATM booth. People will go to central locations to cast their votes, just like they do now. Casting your ballot will also be done in a private booth, just like it’s done now. The voting machine would essentially be a computer terminal. The user interface will employ touch-screen activation, with the option for mouse input and voice recognition (for the visually-impaired).

   Voters will either swipe their registration number into the computer, or enter it manually. The method of entering your votes might be through screen activation, or whichever method Congress deems best. After the voter reviews and confirms the entries on his ballot, he must enter his PIN (personal identification number). This PIN is just like a PIN you use on an ATM machine. It’s not known to anyone but the voter. Without the correct PIN for that registration number, the votes entered into the computer will not be recorded, transmitted or tabulated. It won’t go anywhere.

   The process to ensure proper identification is necessary to stem voter fraud, and as I’ll describe later, ballot manipulation. The PIN number prevents anyone else from voting using that voter registration number. The computer will store votes cast as "write-once" (then read anytime) data, to be sure. But the unique PIN adds an extra layer of assurance that votes cannot be altered (for any given registration number) or multiplied after they’re cast. Only one completed ballot per registration number will be allowed. The photo of the voter on the card will prevent various forms of fraud as well, but at the same time represent a far less intrusive measure than say, having your fingerprints registered, as is required to vote in Mexican elections. Indeed, voter ID cards with photo, thumbprint, voter ID numbers, and magnetic strips are commonplace in the very same countries that the left urges us to emulate with regards to paper ballots."
   Take out the machines and make them produce backups

   The ridiculous fraud in national elections has been favoring the GOP when it comes to machines, but in local elections the ballot stuffing for the democrats especially DLC democrat is intolerable and is using the same machines.

   They are all in this bastardized bullshit together, so again, ALL ballots should be counted at the precinct level with manual audits.

   Doug Eldritch

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   Brantl said on 1/16/2006 @ 6:59am PT: [Permalink]

   If you get people in the polling precinct with the best voter ID available and change your procedure to this: A voter has his thumb scanned for a (unique to voting algorithm) hash number that’s used in hashing the voter ID unique number and then casts his ballot, verifies his choices on the 2 ballots that are produced, (the ballot box copy and the voter’s copy) he agrees the vote is correct and he keeps the legally-binding copy of his vote.

   He ink-thumbprints his copy ONLY and leaves the precinct. He can check his vote by the ID number over the internet and at the precinct.

   If they got it wrong he can be re-thumbscanned and get it CORRECTED to what his legally binding copy says. If the thumbscan doesn’t match he has the option of making another ink thumbprint and showing that they match and then getting his vote corrected, and walks away with all copies of the thumbprints.
   Only in the event of incorrect recording of the vote is any risk to the anonymity of the vote engendered, and wear a ski mask if you want to do that.
   In the event of extra votes discovered with all of the appropriate stuff on the ballot box copies, your asked to return to have your thumbscan checked. They check for duplicate thumbprint hashes at this time, as well. (People who voted twice, won’t come back). You have a couple of days, and if you don’t return to have your vote validated under these circumstances, your vote doesn’t count.

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   Brantl said on 1/16/2006 @ 7:02am PT: [Permalink]

   I submitted that previous post’s idea in greater detail at Black box voting forums, (blackboxvoting.org) search for legally binding copy or legally binding ballot in the text and I think you’ll find it.

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   Doug Eldritch said on 1/16/2006 @ 2:03pm PT: [Permalink]

   Thanks Brant. It isn’t too much security either since identity theft is rampant, and any voter can take a thumbprint using a simple blot of ink.

   Doug