

Riverside County, CA November 7, 2006 General Election

Report to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors



Report Date: December 5, 2006

Prepared by SAVE R VOTE*

a Project of Democracy For America- Temecula Valley (DFA-TV)

*SAVE R VOTE is an acronym for
Safe Auditable Verifiable Elections Require Voter Observation of Touchscreen Equipment

INTRODUCTION

SAVE R VOTE (SRV) focuses on three areas throughout the election observation process:

- Adherence to election and government codes, regulations and directives (and the intent thereof),
- Performance of equipment and staff
- Transparency and auditability of all aspects of the election process

This is our second report on election operations. Please reference our report dated July 11, 2006 for a full report on the primary election held on June 6, 2006.

We have divided this presentation into six segments:

- I. Executive Summary
- II. Pre-election
- III. Election day
- IV. Election night
- V. Post-election canvass
- VI. Recommendations

Appendices are provided for reference regarding equipment issues and photographs of operations.

The information in this report reflects the observations of nearly 100 SRV observers throughout the entire pre-election, election and post-election processes. In all, 15 polling places were observed comprising 28 precincts. Total volunteer time contributed over the entire project exceeded 2,000 hours. It is believed that this is the largest and most comprehensive citizen election observation project in the United States.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past several years, SAVE R VOTE has logged over 3,500 hours of observation and study of the Riverside County election system and has produced several reports documenting the operation (and deficiencies) of the system. With the recent announcement by the Board of Supervisors that it will soon appoint a “Blue Ribbon Commission” to look into the election administration in the county, SAVE R VOTE intends the following report to be a resource for that investigation and for reform of the electoral system in Riverside County.

This report reflects the observations of nearly 100 trained SAVE R VOTE poll observers throughout the entire pre-election, election and post-election processes. In all, 15 polling places were observed comprising 28 precincts. Total volunteer time contributed over the entire project exceeded 2,000 hours. It is believed that this is the largest and most comprehensive citizen election observation project in the United States.

The observations presented in this report touch on possible violations of Federal, State, and County regulations, obstacles to free and unencumbered voting, potential threats to the security and integrity of electronic voting machines, and problems with a timely and auditable vote count. The most significant findings are summarized below:

Legal, Regulatory, and Procedural Compliance

- Refusal to post results at all precincts as required by law
- Failure to sign precinct result tapes as required by law
- Citizens denied meaningful access to the enable any challenges to the processing of absentee ballots as required by law

Security and Equipment

- Failure to establish and maintain security of voting machines from the time of delivery to the polling places until the opening of the polls.
- Failure to maintain security of VVPAT printers and paper trails from the closing of polls until several days later when picked up
- Failure to provide “chain of custody” paperwork related to several precincts from the collection points to the central office
- Failure to provide adequate supplies (paper and printers) to enable continuous operation of the electronic voting machines throughout Election Day

Auditability and Transparency

- The legally sanctioned Election Observer Panel was denied “meaningful access” to the vote counting process as prescribed by law.
- Citizens were denied “meaningful access” to the enable any challenges to the processing of absentee ballots as required by law
- Preferential treatment to some groups over others regarding photographing and videotaping operations

In this report, SAVE R VOTE makes over 50 specific recommendations listed in Section VI of this report. With so many items requiring attention, it will be important to triage the system to identify the most significant issues needing immediate attention. We suggest that the following is a good summation of actions needed immediately.

Independent outside process audits

Audit of existing procedures and compliance with appropriate laws and regulations and recommendations for changes needed for elections in 2007 and 2008

Independent outside financial audit

Hire a qualified audit firm to review the costs of e-voting system from 2000 (inception) to June 30, 2006 with a comparison to cost (including cost per voter) of using paper ballots for that same period. Absentee ballot costs and trends should be reviewed separately (carried forward from July 11, 2006 recommendations). While not referenced in the attached report, it is noted that the annual gross cost per voter has doubled since inception of electronic voting in Riverside County when compared to the annual cost per voter in the four year period immediately preceding implementation. This sharply contrasts with the promise of “saving \$600,000 per year in paper costs” used to justify implementing the system.

Establish Citizens Independent Voting Integrity Commission (CIVIC)

Such a year-round commission would provide direct and meaningful observation of all aspects of the election process and make recommendations to the Board of Supervisors. Such commission shall be comprised of one member appointed by the County Central Committee Chair of each political party and five members from the election integrity community (carried forward from July 11, 2006 report).

Establish security procedures

We must establish adequate security procedures to ensure that voting equipment is reasonably safeguarded from theft and manipulation.

Comply with all appropriate laws, regulations and directives

A directive from the Board to the RoV and action by the Board itself to discontinue the confrontational attitude toward any constructive criticism or recommendations for improvement of the voting system by the election integrity community.

II. PRE-ELECTION

We will address five areas related to the pre-election phase. These are:

- Logic and accuracy testing
- Absentee/mail ballot processing
- Poll worker training
- Delivery and security of voting machines
- Election eve setup of the polling places

Logic and Accuracy (L&A)

The Sequoia Voting System Use Procedures manual requires “The Election official shall establish a Logic and Accuracy Board to complete certification of testing. Not later than seven (7) days before each statewide election, the Secretary of State must receive a copy of the Logic and Accuracy Board’s certification.” SAVE R VOTE was unable to verify the existence of such a board or the membership of the board. SAVE R VOTE can verify that no citizens from SAVE R VOTE were included on the Board, if such a board exists. It is recommended that, at minimum, any such board membership be extended to members of the official Election Observer Panel (EOP).

The title “logic and accuracy” (L&A) implies a pilot test of the election procedures using a current ballot. This would entail three steps: loading the ballot into the machine, casting votes, and counting votes in the same mode as used on Election Day and night. During this election's L&A, the three steps were performed in a test mode that does not reflect the mode used on election night.

Even more importantly, we recommend that Sequoia develop instructions for conducting a full test using the actual election processes. If L&A were performed this way, it would allow Registrar of Voters (RoV) personnel to witness the operation as it happens on Election Day and to truly test the logic and accuracy of the process. This would help to make the process more transparent and auditable.

Significantly, we are calling for Sequoia to develop the procedures; they are the only ones who can develop these tests because they continue to own and control the software used in our hardware.

We have great concern that a private corporation (currently under federal investigation) is in control of secret software that records and counts the votes.

In the past, L&A used ten to twelve machines; this election's testing used only three machines. Like past L&A, this election was advertised as a one day, six-hour event; however, the first day of testing was unsuccessful and a total of four days was required.

Volunteer observers can easily devote one day to testing, but the unexpected three additional days (which included a holiday weekend) made it impossible for the community to observe the full test. We recommend that in the future more machines be set aside for L&A and that testing be completed in one day.

During the time of the L&A testing, actual ballot definition files were being loaded into Direct Record Electronic devices (e-voting machines or DREs) in the warehouse in preparation for the election. SAVE R VOTE and the EOP were unable to verify if the machines in the warehouse had completed L&A testing as required by the Sequoia Procedures and Use Manual. In fact, when SAVE R VOTE and EOP members asked permission to view the L&A testing and the loading of the ballot definition files on the other 3,697 DREs in the warehouse, permission was denied. No valid reason was given for this refusal to allow viewing of this process on the 99+% of the machines that were to be used on Election Day. SRV strongly recommends that accommodations be made in the future for observation of the L&A testing and loading of ballot definition files in the warehouse.

Post Election Logic and Accuracy – Section C.2.6 of the Sequoia Voting System Use Procedures Manual dated February 2006 recommends a post election LAT (logic and accuracy test). It explains, “It allows the AVC Edge Voting machine to be test voted once again to verify continued correct functioning.” SRV highly recommends this double check on the accuracy of each of the machines.

Absentee Voter (A/V) Ballot Processing

Prior to 2000, less than 15% of the voters used absentee ballots. The percentage rose rapidly after legislative changes and the installation of the electronic system: In June 2006 it reached nearly 50% and in November 2006 it was more than 40%, with many of them delivered directly to the polling place.

This election saw a tremendous number of absentee ballots still uncounted a week after Election Day. This appears to have two main causes: This election (as in past elections), many absentee ballots were not counted until after election day, and Riverside County's processes used for handling absentee ballots are very labor intensive. The most time consuming step appears to be sorting the ballots into Supervisor Districts and then into precincts.

We believe that at least two things that could help this situation. One solution would be to purchase a sorting machine system that uses new bar code technology. Bar coding could also help identify the ballot as coming from a registered voter and record that their vote was received. Each of these suggestions would save considerable hourly labor.

The second way to help is to bring in more temporary help the last few days before the election so that all that remains to be counted election night are the ballots received on Election Day. This would increase speed and accuracy, and allow time for random checking/auditing of the accuracy of the sorting and signature verification systems.

Poll Worker Training

Training of Poll Workers is a vital part of the pre-election effort. Poll Workers training is a 2-hour session. Paid citizen volunteers and RoV office personnel attended the training sessions which were held throughout the county. A very basic presentation was made using a guide entitled Election Officer Handbook. This training was mostly lecture. The limited hands-on learning involved setting up and taking down the DREs.

It is widely accepted among business and industry trainers that training is most effective when learners are actively involved in the learning process. Additional hands-on training would support Poll Workers in performing their tasks on Election Day. Sequoia has prepared an option for this type of training; it is found in the Sequoia Use and Procedures Manual where it states: "Poll Worker Training Mode is a method to allow multiple passes through the Official Election mode, from ready-to-open-polls to polls-closed, to facilitate poll Worker training sessions." We recommend that the RoV trainers adopt this approach.

Delivery and Security of Voting Machines

There are Federal and state requirements for maintaining a secure chain of custody of electronic voting machines. That chain begins at the routine storage of the machines. As recommended previously to the Board, video surveillance should be immediately installed in the warehouse where the 3,700 electronic voting machines are stored. Failure to implement this allows for the possibility that individuals could enter the warehouse and implant virus-infected memory cards in the e-voting machines, infect the redundant memory, and when inserted into the input terminal at the central tabulator, to potentially expose the entire election to fraud.

The chain of custody continues with the delivery of the machines to the polling sites. SRV has documented numerous instances of machines being delivered to locations and remaining unsecured for several days. Secure storage is a significant problem in perhaps half of the polling sites in Riverside County. The machines were often delivered as many as six days prior to the election and left unattended ("sleepovers") with little or no provision made for securing them against theft or tampering. They were all delivered on wheeled "dollies," making it very possible for one or two individuals to steal \$20,000 to \$40,000 in machines in minutes.

Another concern raised by SRV and EOP members had to do with background checks on the multitude of delivery personnel contracted to deliver and pick up the machines throughout the county. We have inquired as to what process is in place to ensure that such personnel do not have criminal records, particularly for such crimes as burglary and/or fraud. We also inquired as to what procedures are in place to screen the backgrounds of any last-minute replacements who might be substituted for approved personnel. As of the writing of this report, we have received no response to these issues.

Election Eve Setup of Polling Places

The fifth pre-election area of interest is the setting up of the polling sites on election eve. The sites are not to be set up prior to election eve.

SAVE R VOTE observed that one precinct set up the machines on Thursday November 2. We found that a site in Anza allowed a community organization to setup and take down the machines for the poll workers. We have found no indication that the County asked for the names of those involved in this setup, as it did the SRV persons present on election eve and throughout the day on Tuesday. SRV urges the ROV to be as meticulous in documenting the identities of those who set up the machines as they are in documenting the identities of poll watchers.

In order to coordinate Election Day activities in an orderly manner, SRV volunteers had to research names of precinct inspectors from the RoV Website because the RoV did not provide that information. SRV volunteers had to look up numbers in the phone book and, in some cases, the names were not available. We ask that in the future the RoV provide SRV with contact information for poll inspectors to ensure an orderly coordination of efforts.

SRV volunteer poll watchers called the poll inspectors for their assigned precinct to ask about the time scheduled for setting up the room. Some received the correct information, while others received incorrect information. Several examples illustrate this. Some poll observers arrived on time for set up and found that everything was finished or nearly finished. At other sites, poll observers were refused access to witness the process and/or to get information about the machines. At yet another site, at the designated set up time the SRV poll observer discovered that the machines were already set up, the lights were all on, and the doors were standing open with no one around.

Of the 15 polling sites observed by SAVE R VOTE citizen-volunteers, most precinct workers were courteous and pleasant to work with. There were, however, three locations where there was a definite element of hostility toward the SRV volunteers. This created a far from transparent process and did not follow the Election Observer Panel Plan that provides for full observation of proceedings at the polls. The attitude felt by the poll watchers from a few poll workers/inspectors this election suggests that the culture and attitude expressed to the workers while in training needs to be evaluated before another election season and future poll worker training occurs.

III. ELECTION DAY

Voters experienced extensive delays at numerous polling places, particularly from mid-afternoon to the closing of the polls. Waiting time sometimes exceeded an hour and a half. Potential voters were sometimes sent to other precincts when nearly all the printers were down in their assigned precinct. In some instances, when the voters went to the alternate precinct, that precinct was experiencing similar problems, resulting in high levels of voter frustration. SRV observers spoke with several potential voters who stated they were giving up and not voting, thus effectively disenfranchising these individuals.

We will address four areas related to Election Day:

- Poll opening process
- Polling place locations and size
- Paper ballots at the polls
- Performance of the voting machines

Poll Opening Process

The openings where SRV observers were present were ready for the poll to open on time. However, only about half the precincts followed procedures for the first voters. Several SRV observers reported that other voters were allowed in to vote before the first voter had finished his/her work. For the most part, the poll workers were courteous and helpful to the voters as they signed in.

Polling Place Locations and Size

The locations were easy to locate and some parking was available. We believe that the space provided in nearly half of the polling sites was inadequate. An observer witnessed a site that would have been adequate for one precinct but had to accommodate two precincts.

Crowding hampers the poll workers and poll watchers in observing what is happening in the room. In many polling places, voter privacy may have been compromised when persons signing in at the table were right behind the voter and other voters walking to or from a DRE with little room to pass between. Crowding resulted in voters lining up outside waiting to sign in, something that could have turned away voters if the weather had not been cooperative.

Our recommendation is that the polling sites be reviewed and, if a larger one can not be found, consider placing only one precinct in that location. This might be a way in which the RoV's office could work with community groups to help locate suitable sites.

Paper Ballots at the Polling Places

At a meeting of the Board of Supervisors earlier this year, the RoV made a commitment to post professionally-made signs at all precincts advertising the availability of paper ballots.

In many of the precincts SRV observed, paper ballots were essentially unavailable. The "sign" notifying voters that paper ballots were available was a pink Xerox sheet of paper which sometimes was on the wall, sometimes on a table with other printed forms, and sometime not posted at all.

A SRV observer inquired at the RoV office at Gateway on Election Day as to whether paper ballots were available at that location. He was informed they were available. When he further inquired as to why no sign was posted, the person at the counter said she would check with the Registrar. When she returned, she informed him that she was told "this is an early voting site, and thus not required to post any notice about paper ballots being available" despite the fact that it was, indeed, Election day.

Several SRV observers reported seeing poll workers with written instructions entitled "Reminders to Poll Inspectors" (or similar terminology). These instructions suggested that poll workers keep the paper ballots out of sight and not to offer paper ballots unless the voter asked by one. At one precinct, when the printers were without paper and there were long lines, a poll worker asked her inspector if they could offer the paper ballot; the worker was told in no uncertain terms that the answer was NO. A few minutes later she asked again and was once more told NO. Several minutes later when the paper still had not been replaced, she asked again and was told to go ahead and offer the paper ballots. The paper ballots were gone in minutes.

One SRV observer noted several voters leaving without having voted. When he asked them if they would like to comment, they replied, "You don't want to hear what we have to say." Although he encouraged them to be more expressive, they reiterated in no uncertain terms that "You really don't want to hear what we have to say!"

At several polling places, no private area was provided for those who requested paper ballots.

Performance of the Voting Machines

Now let's take a look at the machines and their performance on November 7, 2006. There were continuous problems with one or more of the following:

- Activators
- Activated cards
- DREs
- Printers

It was often difficult to determine which of these caused the problem. Sometimes it appeared to be the activator because, when another activator was used, the card worked. Other times it seemed that an activator card was not taking the new information, or that the DRE wasn't reading the card, or that the card wasn't inserted into the DRE far enough, or the DRE would not release the card when the voter was finished. In addition, printers jammed and ran out of paper. All of these problems occurred at one time or another in every precinct monitored by SRV.

One SRV observer recorded this note:

“The first voter to vote on machine # 42806 inserted the card, voted, card would not eject, and poll worker kept pressing [yellow] button in back with no success. A new ballot was visible so next voter's activated card was collected (not inserted as the last voter card was still in slot) and the voter voted, another ballot appeared and the next voter's card was collected and they too voted. This went on until 8:48 a.m. or until the machine was taken out of service.”

The SRV observer could not believe his eyes so he followed a voter outside and went 25' away and asked the voter if he was willing to answer a few questions about his voting experience. The first question was, “Did you insert a card?” and he said that he did not. When asked if he voted, he answered yes. When asked if his vote was cast and printed, he answered yes. (The poll worker did not share with the observer what was happening.)

SRV has a long list of incidents that we documented at the precincts and we have no reason to think that these sites were any different from all the others. This listing is attached as an appendix to this report. The poll workers at the polling sites were doing their very best to conduct a fair and honest election with equipment and processes that presented many problems.

IV. ELECTION NIGHT

The areas to be reviewed are:

- Closing of the polls
- Posting of precinct results
- Collection centers
- Processing at the RoV's office

Closing of the Polls

The 8:00 p.m. closing of the polls did not mean that voters were all gone and that the paperwork could get underway. Most polls in our area had voters for some time after 8:00 p.m. The delays were due to printers running out of paper. On average, about 50 voters could vote per machine on one roll of paper. Extra paper was not at the precinct and workers had to wait for the range inspector ("Ranger") to bring more and install it in the printers. In some cases the Ranger would just leave and then be called back because another printer was out of paper, causing further delays.

Interviews with range inspectors could provide meaningful input and recommendations for ways to avoid these kinds of problems in the future.

The number of voters who can vote on a single roll of paper will vary each election with the length of the ballot. When the first roll runs out at a precinct, we recommend that poll workers check the counter on the back of that DRE, and then estimate when the other machines will run out of paper and alert the Ranger. Alternatively, after say 40 to 45 votes per DRE at 3:00 in the afternoon, just replace all the rolls so the precinct is ready for the remainder of the day.

There is an even simpler solution: Print paper ballots to cover the projected vote per precinct and proactively offer them to voters. This would have allowed many voters who walked away to have voted and the ones who stood in line for prolonged periods of time to have been able to vote and be on their way sooner. The cost factor is much less, and the auditing of this system is much faster than with the electronic tapes. The poll workers could have completed their work sooner.

According to the Election Official Handbook, page 89, the "certificate of completion/ballot statement and roster accounting" attests to the total number of voters who cast ballots at the specified precinct and identifies any voters who signed the combined roster and index but who did not vote." Based on observations during this and previous elections, there is an ongoing problem of getting the certificates of completion to balance. In at least one training session for the poll workers it was stated, "If you can't get them to balance, don't worry about it we will fix it," referring to balancing the all paper records related to voters at any given precinct.

Some poll workers were confused as to where the "Memory Cards" were to go for transport to Gateway - in the bag, in the ballot box, or left in the machine. In a number of cases the red bags carrying the memory cards were not secured with a red security tag (as instructed on pg 78 of Election Officers Handbook) before departing from the precinct to go to the collection

center. This was “remedied” at the collection center as security tags were passed out to anyone who requested one. SRV videotaped a number of these incidents.

Most of the inspectors allowed the poll watcher to witness all the processes and see the numbers on the machines. However, the inspectors who were uncooperative in the morning remained so throughout the day.

Precinct Results Report

California election code section 19384 states, “The precinct board shall, before it adjourns, post conspicuously on the outside of the polling place a copy of the result of the votes cast at the polling place. The copy of the result shall be signed by the members of the precinct board.”

As indicated in advance by the RoV, no postings occurred at the schools and residences, in direct conflict with Election Code Section 19384 that requires posting of results at all precincts. The unposted precincts exceeded 150 out of 605 polling places, resulting in over 25% of the precincts being out of compliance. At a number of sites, after experiencing printer problems or just sheer worker exhaustion, poll workers were told they did not need to post the results. At some sites, the manner of posting the results nearly defeated the purpose; for example, result tapes were placed so high that they could not be read without using a ladder; at another, the tapes were braided together. We strongly recommend that a system be worked out to ensure that results are clearly and accessibly posted at every precinct in compliance with state law.

The other issue is failure of the precinct workers to sign the results printouts. This is a legal requirement and failure to enforce this subjects the county to yet another violation of the law. Nearly every precinct tape was unsigned. In fact, SRV was unable to verify if ANY were signed as required by law. SRV recommends that the tapes to be posted by signed as legally required.

Collection Sites

The collection sites are an interesting study in contrasts. We observed five sites from small to the very largest. The small sites seemed to work reasonably well.

The Murrieta collection center was in chaos in June and progressed to a highly disciplined site in November. It was noted, however, that RoV staff were openly hostile and challenging to SRV volunteers and initially told them they were not allowed to videotape in the public parking lot. Upon checking with the RoV office, they concluded that videotaping would be allowed, but ordered SRV volunteers to “remain behind the pylons”. This attitude of open hostility is not conducive to effective citizen observation of the electoral process

The remaining site was chaotic: Cars and trucks were parked everywhere, collection people running all directions trying to see from whom to gather materials. One team couldn’t find their precincts tenth memory card; they pulled out all the materials from the red bag and placed it on the tailgate to try to find the last card. Another car left without turning in their materials and returned a little later. Security tags that should have been applied before leaving

the precinct were passed out without any accounting. Red bags were seen being thrown into the back of an open pickup truck to transport to the Gateway location.

It is also noted that the printers with the voter verified paper audit trails (VVPATs) were left behind at the precincts. This is contrary to the practice in the primary election in June, when they were all transported along with the memory cards to the Gateway location. The VVPATS are the official ballots in the event of a recount, and as such, should dictate maximum security procedures. Transporting them immediately to the Gateway office provides for greater security. Leaving them behind at the polling places, many of which had been shown to be insecure, created a breach of “best practices” security procedures. SRV strongly recommends that this practice be abandoned and the VVPATs be transported with the memory cards to the Gateway office on Election night. The RoV has indicated that no inventory of VVPATs was made.

Processing at the RoV Office

Between 8:30 p.m. and approximately midnight, vehicles arrived at the RoV office on Gateway Drive carrying thousands of voting machine memory cards containing hundreds of thousands of electronic votes. Some of the drivers did not have the proper “chain of custody” paperwork related to the memory cards, thus violating the maintenance of the federal “chain of custody” requirement. Absent the appropriate certification paperwork, it was impossible to verify that what was being delivered was what was loaded onto the vehicles.

The lack of transparency of the vote counting process was most apparent on Election night at the RoV office. No one from the public, including the members of the Election Observer Panel, was allowed to view the input terminals displaying error messages as the thousands of e-voting memory cards were entered into the central tabulator. Observers were able to view only the backs of the input terminals, and when asked the reason for denying observers entry into the central tabulator room, the Assistant Registrar of Voters replied, “We don’t have to tell you why.”

When one observer walked into a small unmarked room that actually had a view of the central tabulator monitors, she was told she had to leave immediately. When she refused to leave, the terminals she was viewing were turned such that they were not viewable, and RoV staff smirked as they turned the terminals. When she objected, she was ultimately confronted by a deputy sheriff. Under threat of arrest, she reluctantly left the room. RoV staff stated that the room was for “media personnel only” and proceeded to post a sign to that effect on the door. SRV recommends that the room be a “shared use” room, as there are typically no more than two or three media personnel in the room at even the busiest of times.

V. POST ELECTION CANVASS

The areas to be reviewed are:

- Processing of absentee voter and paper ballots
- Randomly selected 1% tally processing

Processing of Absentee Voter and Paper Ballots

Processing of the absentee ballots was a cumbersome and labor-intensive nightmare. The actual counting of the ballots didn't start until 9 days after the election. During those nine days, only about six workers were observed taking on the daunting task of sorting approximately 100,000 absentee and other ballots into precinct order.

The RoV posted notification to the public of the beginning of the counting process on 11-15-06, less than 24 hours before it began. When the day came to begin counting, it appeared that about 26 staff were involved. It is not known why the RoV waited nine days to bring in the additional staff. The space to process the ballots appeared to be too small and perhaps this area should be modified as absentee and paper ballots are likely to keep increasing.

Lack of equality of transparency was an issue in this area as well. On one day, the local newspaper came in and took photographs of the myriad of workers processing the absentee ballots and published the photos the next day. The next day, a local television station shot footage of the process and broadcast it on the local news that evening.

However, on the same day the television station shot and broadcast the activities, a member of the Election Observer Panel requested (but was never granted) permission to take photographs or shoot video footage. When he inquired as to why, he was informed by the Assistant Registrar of Voters that "...the media represents the people." The EOP member insisted on hearing a legitimate reason from the RoV herself, and was told every 15 minutes that someone would be out to discuss the request with him.

After an hour, the RoV's secretary appeared in the lobby and took careful notes regarding the request, and then the RoV was observed in the central tabulator room. In the 15 seconds it took for the secretary to go from the lobby to the central tabulator room, the RoV disappeared. After an hour and a half of being told "someone will be out to discuss the request with him," the EOP member announced that he was beginning video taping. Within 10 seconds, the Riverside Police appeared and asked the gentleman to stop taping and leave the premises. Even though he had every legal right to be there, the EOP member agreed to leave the premises without incident.

It is difficult to fathom why it was acceptable for members of the media to take photos and video footage and to simultaneously deny an EOP member (or any citizen, for that matter) the right to do the same. And to have the police actually standing by to swiftly enforce an arbitrary ban on photography and videotaping demonstrates a degree of discrimination not witnessed in recent times.

Randomly Selected 1% Tally

The drawing of the random numbers and identification of the precincts to be reviewed should have been done just prior to the start of the tally. Instead, it was done far too early: eleven days ahead of time. This is not in keeping with the intent of the 1% tally nor does it conform to generally accepted accounting/auditing principles. Prior to the random drawing and subsequent, members of SAVE R VOTE and of the EOP requested that a new random drawing be scheduled on the day of the beginning of the tally, but their requests were ignored.

The actual random selection for the 1% tally audit was conducted correctly.

The room arrangement for the 1% tally was very accommodating to observers – a vast improvement from the primary election where observers were kept sequestered in a very limited area with no ability to see or hear the documents and dialog. During this 1% tally, the room was arranged similarly to the arrangement in San Diego County, as shown to the Board of Supervisors in a video a few weeks prior to this election.

Observers could stand close enough to hear the name called and could see the tally being marked. Photography and video taping (including tripods) were allowed from an area in the middle of the room, providing reasonable access by any member of the public without interfering with the process. Video feeds from ceiling-mounted cameras from four of the five tally stations were projected onto a large screen and one was shown on a television screen. Some of the ceiling cameras used for the projection had so much vibration from the air handling system that they produced unclear and unusable images. Overall, the outstanding physical arrangement of the tally room made the \$40,000 newly-installed camera system virtually unnecessary. These cameras, or ones like them, should instead be installed in the warehouse where the 3,700 voting machines are stored.

SAVE R VOTE highly recommends this room arrangement be used again next time and commends the RoV on the open access provided.

The tally process itself was extremely slow. The first day each of the five tables was given a precinct number for their table and their first of five or ten rolls of tape from their precinct. By the end of the day no one had been able to balance the tape with the machine report. The RoV reported that eventually each tape was balanced, but this went on for seven days to complete the process for the 1% tally. SAVE R VOTE was unable to verify the accuracy of every tally.

On the other hand, the 1% tally on the absentee votes progressed very well. They had two tables with four people at each table. They worked with one precinct at a time. One table finished a precinct by early afternoon on the first day. When asked, the Registrar of Voters stated that the paper tally process was much faster than the electronic (tapes) process.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Our recommendations are divided into the four key election process segments covered in this report:

- Pre-election operations
- Election day operations
- Election night operations
- Post-election canvass operations

Our recommendations are based on the principle that elections should be secure, legal, transparent, and auditable.

A. Pre-election operations recommendation are:

- 1) Establish a Logic and Accuracy Board as required by the Sequoia Operation manual and include citizen members from SAVE R VOTE and/or the official Election Observer Panel (EOP).
- 2) Request that Sequoia Voting systems develop more meaningful logic and accuracy testing that reflects “real-world” voting circumstances
- 3) Return to the practice of testing at least 10 machines during the logic and accuracy testing to provide a more representative sample of the machines to be used in the election
- 4) Completed logic and accuracy testing in the one day timeframe typically associated with this process
- 5) Allow citizens to view the logic and accuracy testing and the loading of the ballot definition files of all voting machines in the warehouse.
- 6) Implement the post-election logic and accuracy testing option provided by Sequoia implemented to double check the accuracy of the voting units.
- 7) Purchase a sorting machine system that uses the new bar code technology should be put in place to speed the sorting of incoming absentee ballots
- 8) Use a bar coding system to quickly identify that ballots coming in are from a registered voter and record that their vote was received
- 9) Hire additional temporary workers before the election to assist in the sorting and counting of all absentee ballots received prior to Election Day
- 10) Expand poll worker training to at least four hours and include hands-on training on the operation of the e-voting units using the “Poll Worker Training Mode” offered by Sequoia Voting Systems
- 11) Immediately install video surveillance in the warehouse where the 3,700 Sequoia Edge II voting machines are stored
- 12) Establish a system whereby voting machines are delivered utilizing “just-in-time” approach so that machines are not left unsecured at voting locations for extended periods of time (“sleepovers”)
- 13) Conduct background checks, on all delivery personnel who deliver and pick up the voting machines and the VVPATs
- 14) Document identities of all persons entering polling sites (for any purpose other than voting) from set-up to closing of the polls.
- 15) Instruct RoV office to provide contact information of poll inspectors upon request to poll watchers, to ensure an orderly coordination of efforts

B. Election Day Operations

- 1) Instruct RoV to work cooperatively with citizens groups and poll inspectors to foster a culture of cooperation.
- 2) Evaluate polling sites for adequacy of space to ensure privacy for the voters and where possible, chairs should be provided for pregnant, disabled or otherwise feeble individuals when voting line waits are longer than 10 minutes
- 3) Prominently post professionally-prepared signs indicating the availability of paper ballots at all precincts (both inside and outside)
- 4) Provide a supply of at least 100 paper ballots for every precinct
- 5) Provide privacy areas for paper-ballot voters at all precincts.
- 6) If voters must wait 10 minutes or more, have election staff proactively offer paper ballots to everyone in line.
- 7) Prohibit any direct or indirect urging of withholding paper ballots
- 8) Thoroughly examine the list of equipment problems listed in the “Equipment Issues” appendix and implement solutions to avoid future problems
- 9) At a minimum, provide additional rolls of VVPAT paper (or pre-loaded VVPAT printers) to all precincts and fully train appropriate precinct staff in loading the paper or printers
- 10) Limit the use of the “yellow button” to allow additional voters to vote without using an activated voter card to situations when no other option is available, as when the remaining machines cannot adequately handle the number of voters waiting to vote in a timely manner. Do this only after contacting the RoV and receiving permission to do so; otherwise, take the machine out of service until the problem can be remedied.

C. Election Night Operations

- 1) Conduct interviews with Range Inspectors to identify any problems they encountered and to obtain their recommended solutions to those problems and to those listed in the Equipment Issues appendix
- 2) Establish a more precise method of estimating how many voters can be accommodated by a single VVPAT printer roll to avoid delays encountered during election day and night
- 3) Provide enhanced poll worker training on balancing after the closing of polls of all the paper records related to voters at each precinct (“Certificate of Completion”).
- 4) Ensure that all poll workers comply with the chain of custody requirements for all memory cards: placing in red transport bags, sealing with red security tags, no removing from sealed compartments at the collection site, etc.)
- 5) Establish a log at each collection site to record any instances where additional red security seals are used, indicating the reason and the precinct numbers
- 6) Print result reports following the closing of the polls, have them signed by the inspector and poll workers, and post them conspicuously on the outside of EVERY polling place as required by Election Code Section 19384
- 7) Arrange with schools and private residences for a location where results can be posted, such as posting on the outside of the fence surrounding the school and/or on a wooden sign post outside the gate, posting on a wooden sign in the front yard of residences, etc., taking precautions to prevent vandalism and theft.
- 8) Emphasize to poll workers that posting is required by law and provides a check and balance system for citizens to double check the results from the central

- tabulator. Attitudes and statements like “we don’t need to worry about how we post it or what happens to it, so long as we post it “must be discouraged.
- 9) Model the operation of the collection centers after the highly disciplined operation at Sam’s Club in Murrieta (but without the tone of confrontation with poll observers).
 - 10) Deliver VVPAT printers and paper rolls to the collection centers along with the memory cards
 - 11) Transport election materials (memory cards, certificates of completion, VVPATs and printed rolls of votes) only in closed vehicles (e.g., not in open-bed vehicles).
 - 12) Conduct a full accounting of all memory cards and VVPATs and printed rolls on election night and issue an exception report as it was done during the primary election in June 2006
 - 13) Pre-screen observers for admission into the central tabulator room to view the processing of the votes on the data input terminals. Allow a reasonable number (e.g., 2) for half-hour periods and then another reasonable number, rotating throughout the night.
 - 14) Allow videotaping and photography in the central tabulator room to document error messages and actions taken in response to the error messages
 - 15) Designate “Media Personnel Only” room as a shared-use room, allowing citizen observers in whenever they do not interfere with media personnel’s use of the room
 - 16) Present fully compliant “chain of custody” documents RoV staff at the Gateway location when memory cards and other critical items are delivered to ensure that what is delivered is what was loaded at the collection site
 - 17) Initiate interpersonal skills training for RoV staff to eliminate confrontational attitudes and comments such as “We don’t have to tell you why.”

D. Post Election Canvass Operations

- 1) Use automated sorting and bar coding equipment to assist in processing the large volume of uncounted absentee and paper ballot
- 2) Begin the counting process for absentee ballots within a few days after Election Day (we suggest not more than four days).
- 3) Publicly post the date the counting process at least 48 hours in advance to allow observers reasonable time to schedule observation.
- 4) To the extent allowed by law, ensure equality by either allowing all parties or no parties to videotape and/or photograph the various processes is essential to ensure no perception of secrecy is created
- 5) Conduct the random drawing for the 1% tally on the same day the tally is commenced
- 6) Once the tally of absentee votes is complete for each precinct, prepare a report and provide it to observers.
- 7) Remove the ceiling cameras in the community room and install them in the warehouse to monitor the safekeeping of the voting machines.
- 8) Design a more efficient process for conducting the 1% tally
- 9) Develop a procedure that allows at least two individuals to simultaneously confirm reconciliations of the 1% tapes
- 10) Make tally sheets available to observers upon request to facilitate the observation and verification process.

Appendix: Equipment Issues

Equipment Issues

Approximately one hundred SAVE R VOTE poll-watcher volunteers monitored 24 precincts in 15 separate polling locations. Volunteers observed equipment problems in 21 of the 24 precincts (88%).

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	10:35 a.m.	Activator card stuck and pushed button to reactive.
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	10:50 a.m.	DRE 44760 wouldn't allow vote change – Poll worker fixed it.
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	2:55 p.m.	DRE Red sign came up & said cannot read the card. New Activator care activated, voter given new card.
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	5:23 p.m.	DRE #1 – replaced paper
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	5:30 p.m.	DRE #2 - replaced paper
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	5:35 p.m.	DRE #5 –rebooted
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	5:40 p.m.	DRE #5 – replaced paper
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	5:52 p.m.	DRE #2 –removed for maintenance
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	6:00 p.m.	DRE #4 –replaced paper
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	6:16 p.m.	DRE #4 –removed for maintenance
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	6:23 p.m.	DRE #3 - down no paper
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	6:30 p.m.	DRE #4 – problem at in use at 6:37
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	6:50 p.m.	DRE #5 vote did not register
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	6:58 p.m.	DRE #3 - Paper removed
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	Unk	1 paper jam
35895, 35872	North Town Hall, Sun City	Unk	Serial # did not match DRE #s
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	2:50 p.m.	DRE down,
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	4:10 p.m.	DRE with stuck card
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	5:05 p.m.	Four (4) printers out of paper
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	5:30 p.m.	All machines out of paper.

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	7:30 p.m.	Four printers were reloaded with paper
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	7:50 p.m.	Fifth printer replaced
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	8:30 p.m.	Three of five machines in 38023 were functioning, and 4 out of 5 in 38017.
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	Unk	DRE#43406 locked up with seal broken & memory card was pulled (voter card then came out of front reader). As result, no *#s were visible & unit was powered off for night.
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	Unk	Card got stuck, took machine out of service, card got stuck again.
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	Unk	Seals on #43421 and #43425 were loose on one end.
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	Unk	Printer on DRE # 43423 paper twisted, ranger fixed.
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	Unk	Three of the first five printers displayed "Test" on paper tapes
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	After closing	Due to most of the printer paper rolls requiring replacement, machine counts will be incomplete as closing out time.
38017, 38023	Calvary Baptist Church, 31087 Nicolas Rd., Temecula	After closing	Due to printer and paper problems Posting of Results was not done.
30006	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	10:00 a.m.	DRE # 42772 switched out to DRE #45345. No votes on DRE #42772 stated by one watcher and 1 stated by another.
30006	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	Unk	The fifth DRE ran out of paper before a Result Report could be printed. The Ranger didn't answer his phone. Tech Dept said to skip "5 th " printer back-u step. The Inspector opened malfunctioning

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
			printer and store in a _____ tape in sealed bag.
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	3:34 p.m.	Second activator card needed for DRE #42780
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	3:43 p.m.	Another activator card replaced
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	4:00 p.m.	DRE# # 42771 had a problem, Inspector was called and he called for support, with the assistance of the Ranger the “guts” of the machine was switched out.
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	4:40 p.m.	DRE# # 42779 malfunctioned; Ranger was called and had it up by 5:25 p.m.
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	4:45 p.m.	Problem with #41779 Ranger was called.
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	6:00 p.m.	DRE# # 42779 had to be reset due to paper jammed – taken out of service, Inspector trying to fix
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	6:06 p.m.	DRE# # 42779 jammed– replaced printer with spare in about 4 minutes.
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	7:40	Printer 25203 – paper jam, election inspector called in told to swap with extra printer; took about 30 minutes. Paper removed from old printer and paper stored in plastic bag new printer serial # 22970
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	Unk	# 42774 did not display “to begin voting insert card” called ___ and was told if rest of display looks like the other machines than ok to vote. Voter using for 1 st time had some problem was corrected using pencil. Still was having problem moving between screens (poll worker helped her) then card did not pop out – finally shut down DRE and another was sent out to replace it. There was one vote on this machine.

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	Unk	DRE# 42775 Activator Card did not pop out – finally shut down DRE and another was sent out to replace it.
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	Unk	DRE# # 42771 Activator Card didn't pop out, a new one was made and worked fine
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	Unk	DRE# #42773 out of paper, Ranger arrived at 2:50 to replace paper
30007	Cole Canyon El. School, Murrieta, CA	After closing	Result Report printing problems: 1 st machine jammed, 2 nd printer stopped midway through recording results on 3 rd DRE
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	8:25 a.m.	DRE# #43393 Activator card stuck, reactivated and it worked after rebooting the machine
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	9:10 a.m.	DRE# # 43394 had to reboot again
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	12:00 p.m.	DRE# # 43389 non-activated card, rebooted machine
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	12:11 p.m.	DRE# # 43388 non-activated card
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	4:45 p.m.	Three printers out of paper, Ranger showed up didn't know how to replace paper. Had John Y pull 2 nd printer to use as example on how to put back together and got it running 5:01.
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	5:15 p.m.	DRE# #43392 paper bunched up, John removed.
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	5:45 p.m.	2 nd printer back up
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	Unk	DRE# # 43387 – voter in wrong precinct so election offer rebooted machine to cancel vote:
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	Unk	DRE# # 43391 had to be rebooted
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	Unk	DRE# # 43391 ran out of paper
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	Unk	DRE# # 43394 had to shut down, due to out of paper
37982, 37984	Anza Community Hall	Unk	Two voters at one DRE, someone called it to the Inspector attention, vote was

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
			stopped and DRE rebooted , new activator card issued, DRE# # 44382
30053	Tovashal Elementary School, 23801 Saint Raphael Dr. Murrieta, CA	First voter	First voter to vote on DRE# # 42806 inserted the card, voted, card would not eject, poll worker Scott kept pressing yellow button in back with no success, Machine was not closed/ cards / was manually taken from voters and the machine was used to collect votes with 1 st voters card stuck in slot. Carol was told to shut machine off at 8:48”
30066, 30070, 30077	Murrieta Church of Christ, 24750 Lincoln Ave, Murrieta, CA	First voter	DRE# # 42849 – Yellow button was pushed on, machine was taken down, Barbara called to have it fixed. Others were allowed in before First Voter was finished.
30066, 30070, 30077	Murrieta Church of Christ, 24750 Lincoln Ave, Murrieta, CA	7:15 a.m.	After voter verified screen Printer didn’t start – P W pushed the yellow button to get it to start
30066, 30070, 30077	Murrieta Church of Christ, 24750 Lincoln Ave, Murrieta, CA	Unk	Out of paper – one didn’t activate the printer after screen was accepted.
30066, 30070, 30077	Murrieta Church of Christ, 24750 Lincoln Ave, Murrieta, CA	7:40 p.m.	Two DREs ran out of paper; 22 or more persons had to wait to use the 3 that were left.
30066, 30070, 30077	Murrieta Church of Christ, 24750 Lincoln Ave, Murrieta, CA	Unk	Out of paper – one didn’t activate the printer after screen was accepted.
30066, 30070, 30077	Murrieta Church of Christ, 24750 Lincoln Ave, Murrieta, CA	Unk	Activator card stuck in machine
30066, 30070, 30077	Murrieta Church of Christ, 24750 Lincoln Ave, Murrieta, CA	Unk	Activator card stuck in another machine
30066, 30070, 30077	Murrieta Church of Christ, 24750 Lincoln Ave, Murrieta, CA	Unk	Machine didn't accept the card (out of service about 25 minutes)
38020	Sycamore Terrance Apartments, 41770	Unk	Four of the machine had to have paper replacement

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
	Margarita Rd. Temecula, CA		
38020	Sycamore Terrance Apartments, 41770 Margarita Rd. Temecula, CA	Unk	DRE# 43414 and 15 both had problems with the red box appearing and having to be "reset"
38020	Sycamore Terrance Apartments, 41770 Margarita Rd. Temecula, CA	Unk	DRE #43412 on four occasions repeated the ballot - card was marked to be replaced
14931, 14934	Wildomar Senior Leisure Community, 323325 S Pasadena,	Unk	Printer 0024593 was broken when first voter tried to vote
14931, 14934	Wildomar Senior Leisure Community, 323325 S Pasadena,	Unk	Printers # 2 and 3 jammed and had to be taken out of service, it took about 1 ½ hours to get them back on line.
14931, 14934	Wildomar Senior Leisure Community, 323325 S Pasadena,	7:10 a.m.	DRE # 42745 tape jammed first time used; closed machine could not fix the roller. Read out on back of machine said "voter inactive" 246
14931, 14934	Wildomar Senior Leisure Community, 323325 S Pasadena,	Unk	Two more DREs went down for about 45 minutes in late afternoon due to paper issues.
14931, 14934	Wildomar Senior Leisure Community, 323325 S Pasadena,	6:00 p.m.	Another DRE went down, took about 10 minutes to replace the paper.
30115	Buchanan Elementary, 40121 Torrey Pines, Murrieta	8:08	# 42926 turned off and restarted
30115	Buchanan Elementary, 40121 Torrey Pines, Murrieta	6:50 p.m.	#42930 ran out of paper; replaced paper and opened again at 7:12 p.m.
30115	Buchanan Elementary, 40121 Torrey Pines, Murrieta	7:15 p.m.	Paper replaced on DRE #42926.
30115	Buchanan Elementary, 40121 Torrey Pines, Murrieta	7:30 p.m.	Paper replaced on DRE #42927.
30115	Buchanan Elementary, 40121 Torrey Pines, Murrieta	Unk	DRE #42928 went down twice due to paper jamming, 1 st time it was down for about 3 hours, it worked for 2 hours before going down a second time, this time it did not work for 3 ½ hours. Ranger opened the printer and re-installed the

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
			paper however the DRE did not come back on. Ranger brought new machine at 6:00 and it worked. Change was logged in book.
30115	Buchanan Elementary, 40121 Torrey Pines, Murrieta	Unk	When paper replaced on # 42928 it had to be turned off and restarted. Card replaced.
30115	Buchanan Elementary, 40121 Torrey Pines, Murrieta	Unk	DRE# 1 had problems twice with card not working, new card issued and used in different DRE the next time. Card didn't work had to be released with yellow button, new card issued and voter was able to vote, it took about 12 minutes to fix.
30115	Buchanan Elementary, 40121 Torrey Pines, Murrieta	Unk	New activator card were issued several times throughout the day.
30011	Thompson Middle School, 24040 Hayes Ave, Murrieta	6:57 p.m.	#42789 ran out of paper and it was closed down
30011	Thompson Middle School, 24040 Hayes Ave, Murrieta	7:25 p.m.	Activator card rejected, inspector out of room, when she returned she pushed the button to release the card and issued a new one to the voter.
30011	Thompson Middle School, 24040 Hayes Ave, Murrieta	Unk	Printers had paper jams and ran out causing backup through out the day.
30011	Thompson Middle School, 24040 Hayes Ave, Murrieta	Unk	Out of paper, Inspector closed the machine.
30099, 30100	Alta Murrieta El. School, 39475 Whitewood Rd., Murrieta	Unk	DRE # 5 in Precinct 30100 did not accept activator card.
30099, 30100	Alta Murrieta El. School, 39475 Whitewood Rd., Murrieta	Unk	6 th printer for 30099 didn't work, Ranger instructed them to use the 6 th printer from 30100 for all Results Reports.
30102	Golf Knowls, 29070 Camino Alba, Murrieta	7:00 a.m.	One DRE didn't work; replaced a little after 8:00 a.m.
30102	Golf Knowls, 29070 Camino Alba, Murrieta	3:00 p.m.	Starting at about 3:00 machines started running out of paper
30102	Golf Knowls, 29070 Camino Alba, Murrieta	4:17 p.m.	Three machines out of paper.
30102	Golf Knowls, 29070 Camino	Unk	DRE # 5 did not except vote,

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
	Alba, Murrieta		voter asked for help. It appeared that the election official cleared the screen and voter tried again still wouldn't count vote, 3 rd time it worked.
30102	Golf Knowls, 29070 Camino Alba, Murrieta	Unk	Voter having difficulty asked for help, poll worker unplugged machine and re-plugged to try and fix the problem. They did this to two machines before the person was able to vote, no one else seemed to have a problem with either machine.
30102	Golf Knowls, 29070 Camino Alba, Murrieta	9:45 a.m.	Activator card didn't work, card was replaced right away
14750	The Farm, 33430 Harvest Way, Wildomar	7:00 a.m.	DRE didn't work; it was replaced a little after 8:00 a.m.
14750	The Farm, 33430 Harvest Way, Wildomar	3:00 p.m.	Starting at about 3:00 machines started running out of paper.
14750	The Farm, 33430 Harvest Way, Wildomar	4:17 p.m.	Three machines out of paper.
14750	The Farm, 33430 Harvest Way, Wildomar	Unk	DRE # 5 did not except vote, voter asked for help. It appeared that the election official cleared the screen and voter tried again still wouldn't count vote, 3 rd time it worked.
14750	The Farm, 33430 Harvest Way, Wildomar	Unk	Voter having difficulty asked for help, poll worker unplugged machine and re-plugged to try and fix the problem. They did this to two machines before the persons were able to vote, no one else seemed to have a problem with either machine.
		9:45 a.m.	Printer # 4 card didn't work, activator card was replaced right away
11404, 11406	Pathway Christian Church, 6755 Victoria Ave, Riverside	First Voter	Had trouble with the first two DREs (41950 and 46) they tried to use, message "voter card invalid" taken out of service for 15 minutes. 41950 had same problem a few

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
			minutes later and was re-booted. Activator Machine was switched and it seemed to work better.
11404, 11406	Pathway Christian Church, 6755 Victoria Ave, Riverside	2:35 p.m.	Printer jammed – reattached paper.
11404, 11406	Pathway Christian Church, 6755 Victoria Ave, Riverside	Unk	Paper had to be replaced as the day unfolded, some were mentioned in report but due to the number of votes cast on each machine they would all have needed additional paper or be removed from service.
11404, 11406	Pathway Christian Church, 6755 Victoria Ave, Riverside	Unk	Problem through out the day with cards not working.
11404, 11406	Pathway Christian Church, 6755 Victoria Ave, Riverside	Unk	DRE rebooted or turned on and off (We are not sure if this is power off or yellow button)
11404, 11406	Pathway Christian Church, 6755 Victoria Ave, Riverside	Unk	Activator card stuck in DRE, had to have assistance to remove (yellow button)
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	4:45 p.m.	Three printers out of paper, Ranger showed up didn't know how to replace paper. Had John Y pull 2 nd printer to use as example on how to put back together and got it running at 5:01
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	5:15 p.m.	John removed 43392 at 5:15 paper bunched up.
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	5:45 p.m.	2 nd printer 26447 back up
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	Unk	Two voters at one DRE, someone called it to the Inspector attention, vote was stopped and DRE rebooted, new activator card issued, # 44382
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	Unk	Paper jammed, closed machine and called the Ranger, he came a cleared the machine and returned it to service.

Precinct(s)	Location:	Time	Problem
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	Unk	Another printer jammed in other precinct.
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	Unk	Paper jammed again Ranger couldn't fix changed out printer and placed paper roll was removed from the machine and placed in evidence bag and marked.
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	Unk	Paper jammed, shut machine down ballot cast but not printed.
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	Unk	Activator cards not activating DREs, Inspector ejected card and gave voter a new one.
11424, 11428	Grove Bookstore, 19321 Grove Community Dr., Riverside	Unk	The first voter to vote on machine # 42806 inserted the card, voted, card would not eject, poll worker Scott kept pressing button in back with no success. Ballot was visible so next voter's activated card was collected and the voter voted, another ballot appeared and the next voter's card was collected and they to voted. This went on until 8:48 a.m. or until the machine was taken out of service.